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Abstract
The article describes a fast solution to propaganda detection at SemEval-2020 Task 11, based on
feature adjustment. We use per-token vectorization of features and a simple Logistic Regression
classifier to quickly test different hypotheses about our data. We come up with what seems to
us the best solution, however, we are unable to align it with the result of the metric suggested
by the organizers of the task. We test how our system handles class and feature imbalance by
varying the number of samples of two classes (Propaganda and None) in the training set, the size
of a context window in which a token is vectorized and combination of vectorization means. The
result of our system at SemEval2020 Task 11 is F-score=0.37.
1 Introduction
Propaganda is a complex phenomenon that was studied in psychology (Childs, 1936), sociology (Jackall,
1995; Klaehn and Mullen, 2010), theory of communication (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2018; Severin et
al., 1997), pedagogy (Hobbs and McGee, 2014; Smith, 1974), history (Taylor, 2013), linguistics (Lukin,
2013), and other sciences. Naturally, the task of automatic propaganda detection has been set and ap-
proached in different ways. Proppy, an on-line service, detects propaganda in news articles and clusters
them according to an index of propaganda (Barro´n-Cedeno et al., 2019). It daily analyzes emerging
texts, identifies events described in them, discards near-duplicates, and, lastly, computes propaganda in-
dex on the basis of n-gram features, vocabulary, its richness, style, readability, and NEws LAndscape
(NELA) (Horne et al., 2018). In the Propaganda Analysis Project, the propaganda detection is more
focused on locating propaganda within a text. At the Hack News Datathon 1 Task 3 was to detect a
fragment containing propaganda. However, it was paired with classifying it according to 18 techniques 2,
same as the Fragment Level Classification at the shared task of “Fine-Grained Propaganda Detection”
(EMNLP2019) (Da San Martino et al., 2019). The competition of Da San Martino et al. (2020) evaluates
these two stages separately. Although it is hard to map results of previous competitions on the current
one, the former revealed some life hacks that can be of use in the latter. For example, as noted by H.T.
Madabushi (2019), extracting fragments of propaganda is similar to the task of Named Entity Recogni-
tion, in that they are both span extraction tasks. Their system ProperGander was partially based on the
BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) solution for NER. However, probably, the main lesson learned from the first
two events was about the necessity of using BERT (or at least a deep-learning neural network) to achieve
a state-of-the-art result.
In the current article, we proudly present a no-BERT and even no-deep-learning solution for the task
of Span Identification. Our choice not to utilize contextualized vectors such as BERT is grounded by
the following reasons. (1) In the annotation to “Poor Man’s BERT: Smaller and Faster Transformer
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. License details: http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
1https://www.datasciencesociety.net/hack-news-datathon/
2These 18 techniques have grown from the 1930s American Institute of Propaganda Analysis materials (Miller, 1939) and
more recent investigations both into the tools of propaganda (Torok, 2015; Teninbaum, 2009, and others), and into the rules of
good argument (Weston, 2018).
Models” (Sajjad et al., 2020), it is noted that BERT-based models require certain laboratory facilities,
and our team is not from a lab. (2) Even in a lab, BERT takes time to train. So, it is also a slow man’s
choice that deprives one from quickly testing many hypotheses. (3) We were unable to find a neural
classifier that would replace a simpler classifier in our best solution before the end of the competition.
Even a pre-trained BERT model of T.Wolf et al. (2019) takes about 40 minutes per 1 epoch to train in
Google Colab, when our model takes 2-3 minutes to train and predict.
The paper is organized as follows: we first describe our idea of class and feature imbalance in propa-
ganda; we, then, outline the basics of our classifier; we devote a paragraph to testing hypotheses about
our data and conclude about the usability of our system.
2 Propaganda in News Articles
The verbal propaganda in a news article is a stretch of text written with an intent to influence the
reader’s opinion 3 with arguments that lead to conclusions advantageous to the author. The communica-
tive intent is to control and manipulate the reader. The tools are cognitive, logical, emotional and other
means to confuse the reader (verbal fouling), and the verbal representation adds up information to what
has to be said as a fact in a news article as a genre: the known facts and the believed-to-be truth 4. Hence,
we expect that propaganda enlarges the size of a textual unit where it appears. This unit is usually a
sentence: according to Da San Martino et al. (2019), propaganda takes about half a sentence. And the
sentences with propaganda tend to be longer, as reported by creators of the PIG system at the Hack News
Datathon 5.
The attribute of secrecy requires that propaganda looks like its non-propagandist context. So, it should
not differ much from the context in its lexical, grammatical or stylistic expression: there should be a
difference, but slight. Rashkin et al. (2017) look at four kinds of news articles (reliable, hoax, propa-
gandistic and satiric) and find that they have linguistic features that are more frequent in fake news (the
difference is statistically significant): pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ and their forms, modal, action, manner
adverbs, words semantically related to swear, sexual, see, negation 6, strong and weak subjective etc. 7
At the same time they enlist some features which are not in the fake news, but these features are fewer.
As mentioned, propaganda should look like news, but with a bit of additional “foul” content. Hence, the
method of semantic vectors (with due regard for other methods) must be useful in propaganda detection
to extract semantic features of the class “propaganda”, but it will not be as useful in defining the class of
“non-propaganda”.
To sum up, there are linguistic features that are more common in propaganda than in non-propaganda,
and there are nearly no linguistic features of non-propaganda that are uncommon in propaganda (fea-
ture imbalance). Further, propaganda is less common than non-propaganda (class imbalance). Finally,
propaganda takes about half a sentence; sentences with propaganda tend to be longer; propaganda is
emotionally colored.
3 System Architecture
Detection of propaganda as a fragment of an article (fragment or span identification) presupposes that
the minimum textual unit that holds it is a word form. However, if it neighbors with punctuation marks,
3In this respect Edward Sapir’s conclusions hold true: “It is generally difficult to make a complete divorce between objective
reality and our linguistic symbols of reference to it; and things, qualities and events are on the whole felt to be what they are
called.” (Sapir, 1933). But at the same time, what you consider propaganda depends on your point of view, cf. Edward Bernays’s
opinion as cited by Hobbs et al. (2014): “The advocacy of what we believe in is education. The advocacy of what we don’t
believe is propaganda”.
4“Ellul believed that truth does not separate propaganda from “moral forms” because propaganda uses truth, half-truth, and
limited truth. A similar statement from British Labour politician Richard Crossman is that “the art of propaganda is not telling
lies but rather seeing the truth you require and giving it mixed up with some truths the audience wants to hear” (Higham, 2013,
p.2).” (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2018)
5https://www.datasciencesociety.net/datathon-hacknews-solution-pig-propaganda-identification-group/
6According to LIWC lexicon (Pennebaker et al., 2015).
7There seem to be reasonable grounds behind these features. For example, it is easier to negate something that has been
never or rarely encountered before, as the burden of proof lies on somebody who rather states existence, cf. the historical case
of in-existence of black swans.
numbers, etc. the latter can also be attributed to the fragment. Hence, the per-token approach is very
common in solutions to tasks organized by the Propaganda Analysis Project: Yoosuf and Yang (2019)
use BERT to classify each token into 20 classes (18 propaganda techniques, none and “auxiliary”); Gupta
et al. (2019) create a token vector from a combination of features, including an embedding vector of
a word and sentence; Ek and Ghanimifard (2019) combine a vector of a token from three vectors of
contextualized embeddings (ELMo (Peters et al., 2018), BERT (Devlin et al., 2019), GROVER (Zellers
et al., 2019)); Alhindi et al. (2019) and Yoosuf and Yang (2019) use not only word but also character
embeddings, as some morphemes, e.g. “-ist”, can be frequent in propaganda.
As mentioned, in this project we decided to focus on a fast solution that would allow us to test many
hypotheses about our data. As spans should not contain just words, we chose a token as a minimum
unit of a span, regardless whether it is a word form, a punctuation mark, etc. With tokens that are not
actual words, it is important to rely on the context of each token — this is what we base our model on.
A context window is a chunk of text that is within n tokens to the left and n tokens to the right from
the given token; the adjustable parameter of the context window is its size n. If the token has too few
tokens to the left or right, the context window simply shrinks. We tokenize texts with SpaCy (Honnibal
and Johnson, 2015): the EnCoreWebLg model 8. The machine learning algorithm that we finally chose
is the Logistic Regression (LR) implemented in Scikit-Learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011). The reasons for
that were, first, the fastness of LR and, second, it proved to be one of the most efficient classifiers for the
data models that we tested at the preliminary stage of research. Also, LR can be considered a shallow
neural network and, hence, a baseline to test how neural networks treat the data model.
3.1 Data Model, Adjustable Parameters, Evaluation
As mentioned, the unit of classification is a token extracted with SpaCy. The token is considered within a
context window of length n tokens to the right and left from the given token. Our data model is grounded
by our approach. For each token it combines:
1. An embedding vector of the token: size 200, window = 7, acquired with Word2vec model of Gen-
sim (Rˇehu˚rˇek and Sojka, 2010). This is a safety model in case SpaCy does not know the token. The
model is trained on the sentences of all articles in the training, development and test sets. Prepocess-
ing, lemmatization and sentence splitting are done with SpaCy 9.
2. An embedding vector of the token: size 300, acquired with SpaCy “vector” command.
3. An embedding vector of the context window: size 300, acquired with SpaCy “vector” command. To
get it and the two next vectors, we cut out the part of the text that belongs to the context window
and only then vectorize it.
4. A sentiment vector of the context window: size 4, acquired with NLTK Vader Sentiment Intensity
Analyzer (Hutto and Gilbert, 2014; Bird et al., 2009).
5. A semantic vector of the context window of size 39, acquired with our vectorizer based on Roget’s
Thesaurus (Mikhalkova and Karyakin, 2017a; Mikhalkova and Karyakin, 2017b).
The final length of the vector is 843. At the competition, we normalized the vectors with Scikit-Learn
“preprocessing.normalize”.
We do not add such a parameter as the length of the sentence in which the token is found (although
we mentioned it as a characteristic one) as, when added to the vector, even normalized, it significantly
decreases result of the Logistic Regression.
Given the feature- and class-imbalance, we have the following parameters to tune in our data model:
1. Size of context window n.
8https://spacy.io/models/en#en_core_web_lg. Note that when Spacy detects a pronoun, it adds ’-PRON-’
to the list of lemmas.
9However, SpaCy sometimes lemmatizes the same words differently. So, some few tokens that are not in Word2vec are
dropped from classification. The older the Word2vec model is, the more often such tokens occur.
Figure 1: Overlapping and neighboring fragments of propaganda calculated per character: blue – fewer
overlaps, neighbours; red – otherwise. Square 1: full overlaps of characters; Squares 2-4: full overlaps
plus neighbours within 5, 20, 30 characters to the left and right. Classes: 1 - Loaded L., 2 - Name C., 3 -
Repetition, 4 - Exagg., 5 - Doubt, 6 - Appeal to Fear, 7 - Flag-W., 8 - Causal O., 9 - Slogans, 10 - Appeal
to A., 11 - Black-and-White C., 12 - Thought-Term., 13 - Whatabout., 14 Bandwagon.
2. Number of propaganda and non-propaganda samples in the training set.
3. Number of samples of each type of propaganda in the class of propaganda in the training set.
4. Number of articles to give non-propaganda samples for the training set.
As concerns probability of the same tokens belonging to more than one fragment of propaganda (due to
difference in classes), we do not consider it in our model. The heat-map on Figure 1, the left-most square,
shows that propaganda fragments do not co-occur so often: most of the field is blue. This co-occurrence
seems to depend on how frequent the class is (see class “Loaded Language”, for example) with one
exception: class “Doubt”, although it is not among the most frequent, tends to co-occur with Loaded
Language and Name Calling more often than its neighbors. When we enlarge the interval including not
only overlaps, but neighboring within n characters (the three other squares), this trend holds.
To test our algorithm before the competition we applied F-score for per-token classification: true
positive values are tokens correctly classified as propaganda and false negative are tokens correctly
classified as non-propaganda. During the competition, we had difficulty aligning our results with the
results we got for the development set in the system offered by the organizers. The organizers’ system
is per-character F-score that also takes into account the number of fragments (spans). For now, it is
hard to say whether our results are hard to align due to per-token and per-character approach or that
the organizers’ approach punishes for too few or too many fragments. In this article, to evaluate the
result we will simply be using percentage of correctly and wrongly classified tokens for the two classes:
Propaganda and None.
3.2 Testing
To tune our model, we experimented with some of the adjustable parameters mentioned above (each
parameter is a hypothesis about our data): the number of features of each class and the size of the context
window. The ML classifier is LogisticRegression(solver=’liblinear’,penalty=’l2’,C=0.1). Given two sets
of token vectors: 10,000 from fragments with propaganda and 10,000 — without propaganda 10 of the
competition’s official train set, and the vectors of test set, let us first check how the number of vectors of
each class influences the mentioned percentages. The radar chart on Figure 2, left, shows that an equal
number of vectors of each class (Propaganda and None) in the train set gives an even performance, but
when we create disbalance, e.g. put 7,000 vectors of class Propaganda and 10,000 of None in the train set,
it can lead to a more favorable treatment of a class. For further testing we will stick with the combination
of 7,000 Propaganda and 10,000 None as we chose this combination at the competition. It gives a very
good performance for the class None and a fairly good one for Propaganda.
10Although it would be easier to take the first 10,000 non-propagandist tokens, tests showed that the more articles give None
samples, the better.
Figure 2: Left: system’s result on combinations of features “Propaganda” and “None”. Right (clockwise):
system’s result when we add up a sub-vector to the result vector of a token. Y-axis: percentage of tokens
correctly and wrongly classified in each class.
Figure 3: Percentage of tokens correctly and wrongly classified in each context window. X-axis: the size
of the context window.
Now, let us test the size of the window. Figure 3 shows that there are two peaks where classification
of None is best: 5 and 7. And, although correct classification of Propaganda is lower than usual at them,
it is quite even compared to performance at other context windows. For the competition we have chosen
the context window of size 7.
As for inclusion of different vector types in the final vector, the radar chart in Figure 2, right, shows
how adding these types (if we go clockwise starting with just Word2vec vector) balances the proportion
of False Positive and True Negative cases, and increases the number of correctly classified Propaganda
tokens. However, normalizing the final vector now seems to us wrong, as it tangibly decreases the number
of correctly classified None vectors.
Our official result at SemEval-2020, Task 11 is: F-score=0.37490, precision=0.37967,
recall=0.37025. Our code is available at https://github.com/evrog/
Propaganda-Detection-at-SemEval-2020.
4 Conclusion
We have described our system of automatic propaganda detection at SemEval-2020. The system is
designed so as to allow us to quickly test many feature parameters. We call it a kitchen solution in the
title: coming in small, but handy and utilizable blocks. In Google Colab, our classifier takes 141 seconds
(without accelerator) and 128 seconds (with GPU accelerator) to train and calculate the result on the test
data.
The idea of feature imbalance has led us to using an unbalanced combination of Propaganda and None
token vectors in the data set. Also, we have experimented with the size of a context window in which
propaganda becomes most discernible and ended up with size 7, the number which peculiarly correlates
with data on human short-term memory: “the 7-item limit” (Coon and Mitterer, 2008). It seems to us that
this correlation is suggestive of the idea that, in the end, what we, as readers, are able to call propaganda,
is propaganda.
References
Tariq Alhindi, Jonas Pfeiffer, and Smaranda Muresan. 2019. Fine-tuned neural models for propaganda detection
at the sentence and fragment levels. In Proceedings of the Second Workshop on Natural Language Processing
for Internet Freedom: Censorship, Disinformation, and Propaganda, pages 98–102, Hong Kong, China, nov.
Association for Computational Linguistics.
Alberto Barro´n-Cedeno, Giovanni Da San Martino, Israa Jaradat, and Preslav Nakov. 2019. Proppy: A system
to unmask propaganda in online news. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol-
ume 33, pages 9847–9848.
Steven Bird, Ewan Klein, and Edward Loper. 2009. Natural language processing with Python: analyzing text with
the natural language toolkit. O’Reilly Media, Inc.
Harwood L. Childs. 1936. The American Political Science Review, 30(2):389–390.
D. Coon and J.O. Mitterer. 2008. Introduction to Psychology: Gateways to Mind and Behavior. Available Titles
CengageNOW Series. Cengage Learning.
Giovanni Da San Martino, Seunghak Yu, Alberto Barro´n-Ceden˜o, Rostislav Petrov, and Preslav Nakov. 2019.
Fine-grained analysis of propaganda in news articles. In Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical
Methods in Natural Language Processing and the 9th International Joint Conference on Natural Language
Processing, EMNLP-IJCNLP 2019, EMNLP-IJCNLP 2019, Hong Kong, China, November.
Giovanni Da San Martino, Alberto Barro´n-Ceden˜o, Henning Wachsmuth, Rostislav Petrov, and Preslav Nakov.
2020. SemEval-2020 task 11: Detection of propaganda techniques in news articles. In Proceedings of the 14th
International Workshop on Semantic Evaluation, SemEval 2020, Barcelona, Spain, September.
Jacob Devlin, Ming-Wei Chang, Kenton Lee, and Kristina Toutanova. 2019. BERT: Pre-training of deep bidirec-
tional transformers for language understanding. In Proceedings of the 2019 Conference of the North American
Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long and
Short Papers), pages 4171–4186, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Adam Ek and Mehdi Ghanimifard. 2019. Synthetic propaganda embeddings to train a linear projection. In
Proceedings of the Second Workshop on Natural Language Processing for Internet Freedom: Censorship, Dis-
information, and Propaganda, pages 155–161, Hong Kong, China, November. Association for Computational
Linguistics.
Pankaj Gupta, Khushbu Saxena, Usama Yaseen, Thomas Runkler, andHinrich Schu¨tze. 2019. Neural architectures
for fine-grained propaganda detection in news. In Proceedings of the Second Workshop on Natural Language
Processing for Internet Freedom: Censorship, Disinformation, and Propaganda, pages 92–97, Hong Kong,
China, November. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Renee Hobbs and Sandra McGee. 2014. Teaching about propaganda: An examination of the historical roots of
media literacy. Journal of Media Literacy Education, 6(2):5.
Matthew Honnibal and Mark Johnson. 2015. An improved non-monotonic transition system for dependency
parsing. In Proceedings of the 2015 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, pages
1373–1378, Lisbon, Portugal, September. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Benjamin D Horne, Sara Khedr, and Sibel Adali. 2018. Sampling the news producers: A large news and feature
data set for the study of the complex media landscape. In Twelfth International AAAI Conference on Web and
Social Media.
Clayton J. Hutto and Eric Gilbert. 2014. Vader: A parsimonious rule-based model for sentiment analysis of social
media text. In ICWSM.
Robert Jackall. 1995. Propaganda, volume 8. NYU Press.
Garth S Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell. 2018. Propaganda & persuasion. Sage Publications.
Jeffery Klaehn and Andrew Mullen. 2010. The propaganda model and sociology: understanding the media and
society. Synaesthesia: Communication Across Cultures, 1(1):10–23.
Annabelle Lukin. 2013. Journalism, ideology and linguistics: The paradox of chomskys linguistic legacy and his
propaganda model. Journalism, 14(1):96–110.
Harish Tayyar Madabushi, Elena Kochkina, and Michael Castelle. 2019. Cost-sensitive bert for generalisable
sentence classification with imbalanced data. EMNLP-IJCNLP 2019, pages 125–134.
Elena Mikhalkova and Yuri Karyakin. 2017a. Detecting intentional lexical ambiguity in english puns. In Proceed-
ings of the International Conference ”Dialogue 2017” Moscow, May 31-June 3, 2017.
Elena Mikhalkova and Yuri Karyakin. 2017b. Punfields at semeval-2017 task 7: Employing rogets thesaurus in
automatic pun recognition and interpretation. In Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Semantic
Evaluation (SemEval-2017), pages 426–431.
Clyde R Miller. 1939. Propaganda and the european war. The Clearing House: A Journal of Educational
Strategies, Issues and Ideas, 14(2):67–73.
F. Pedregosa, G. Varoquaux, A. Gramfort, V. Michel, B. Thirion, O. Grisel, M. Blondel, P. Prettenhofer, R. Weiss,
V. Dubourg, J. Vanderplas, A. Passos, D. Cournapeau, M. Brucher, M. Perrot, and E. Duchesnay. 2011. Scikit-
learn: Machine learning in Python. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 12:2825–2830.
JamesW Pennebaker, Ryan L Boyd, Kayla Jordan, and Kate Blackburn. 2015. The development and psychometric
properties of liwc2015. Technical report, Austin, TX: University of Texas at Austin.
Matthew E. Peters, Mark Neumann, Mohit Iyyer, Matt Gardner, Christopher Clark, Kenton Lee, and Luke Zettle-
moyer. 2018. Deep contextualized word representations. In Proc. of NAACL.
Hannah Rashkin, Eunsol Choi, Jin Yea Jang, Svitlana Volkova, and Yejin Choi. 2017. Truth of varying shades: An-
alyzing language in fake news and political fact-checking. In Proceedings of the 2017 Conference on Empirical
Methods in Natural Language Processing, pages 2931–2937.
Radim Rˇehu˚rˇek and Petr Sojka. 2010. Software Framework for Topic Modelling with Large Corpora. In Proceed-
ings of the LREC 2010 Workshop on New Challenges for NLP Frameworks, pages 45–50, Valletta, Malta, May.
ELRA. http://is.muni.cz/publication/884893/en.
Hassan Sajjad, Fahim Dalvi, Nadir Durrani, and Preslav Nakov. 2020. Poor man’s bert: Smaller and faster
transformer models.
Edward Sapir. 1933. Language in: Encyclopaedia of the social sciences. New York, 9:155–169.
Werner Joseph Severin, James W Tankard, et al. 1997. Communication theories: Origins, methods, and uses in
the mass media. Longman New York.
Bonnie Smith. 1974. Critically Reading for Propaganda Techniques in Grade Six. Ph.D. thesis, M. Ed. Thesis,
Rutgers University, The State University of New Jersey.
Philip M Taylor. 2013. Munitions of the mind: A history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present era.
Manchester University Press.
Gabriel H Teninbaum. 2009. Reductio ad hitlerum: Trumping the judicial nazi card. Mich. St. L. Rev., page 541.
Robyn Torok. 2015. Symbiotic radicalisation strategies: Propaganda tools and neuro linguistic programming.
SRI Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western .
Anthony Weston. 2018. A rulebook for arguments. Hackett Publishing.
Thomas Wolf, Lysandre Debut, Victor Sanh, Julien Chaumond, Clement Delangue, Anthony Moi, Pierric Cistac,
Tim Rault, R’emi Louf, Morgan Funtowicz, and Jamie Brew. 2019. Huggingface’s transformers: State-of-the-
art natural language processing. ArXiv, abs/1910.03771.
Shehel Yoosuf and Yin Yang. 2019. Fine-grained propaganda detection with fine-tuned BERT. In Proceedings of
the Second Workshop on Natural Language Processing for Internet Freedom: Censorship, Disinformation, and
Propaganda, pages 87–91, Hong Kong, China, November. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Rowan Zellers, Ari Holtzman, Hannah Rashkin, Yonatan Bisk, Ali Farhadi, Franziska Roesner, and Yejin Choi.
2019. Defending against neural fake news. CoRR, abs/1905.12616.
